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Abstract
This paper introduces asymmetric awareness into the classical principal-agent model and
discusses the optimal contract between a fully aware principal and an unaware agent. The
principal enlarges the agent’s awareness strategically when proposing the contract. He faces
a trade-off between participation and incentives. Leaving the agent unaware allows him to
exploit the agent’s incomplete understanding of the world. Making the agent aware enables
the principal to use the revealed contingencies as signals about the agent’s action choice. The
optimal contract reveals contingencies that have low probability but are highly informative
about the agent’s effort.
JEL Classification: D01, D83, D86.
Keywords: Unawareness, Moral Hazard, Incomplete Contracts.
1 Introduction
The standard moral hazard model analyzes the optimal contract between a principal and an agent
in the presence of privately observable effort. As in standard economic models, the underlying
assumption is that all decision makers are fully aware. That is, both the principal and the agent
know every possible outcome realization and its distribution conditional on the agent’s effort. How-
ever, in reality there are contracting situations where one party has a better understanding of the
underlying uncertainties than the other. The question I want to address in this paper is whether
the party with superior awareness can use his better understanding of the world strategically in
the presence of moral hazard.
∗Department of Economics, European University Institute, Via dei Roccettini 9, I-50014 San Domenico di Fiesole
(FI) - Italy, E-mail: sarah.auster@eui.eu.
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To illustrate this, consider the owner of a firm who wants to hire a manager. It is possible that
the firm owner is aware of more opportunities and liabilities concerning his firm than the manager.
Suppose, for example, that there is the possibility that one of the firm’s products has adverse effects
on the health of consumers. As a consequence, it is possible that the firm has to recall the product
and faces severe legal liabilities. Whether the product’s potential health threat becomes public
or not is uncertain and depends on the manager’s effort. Suppose further that the possibility of
this event never crossed the manager’s mind. The question is then, under which conditions it is
profitable for the firm owner to disclose a possible recall and its legal consequences to the manager
when offering the contract. The model shows that there is a trade off between participation and
incentives. First, if the firm owner does not reveal the potential threat to the manager, he designs
the contract such that the manager receives the minimal payment if the recall is realized. Since
the manager does not take into account such an event, the participation constraint is less costly to
satisfy. The size of the participation effect depends on the probability of the event. If the poten-
tial recall and its legal consequences are highly probable, it is easier to hire the manager without
disclosing the possibility of the product’s health threat. Second, since the probability of the health
threat becoming public depends on the effort of the manager, its realization is a signal about the
manager’s effort. Disclosing the potential threat makes the incentive constraint less costly to satisfy.
The size of the incentive effect depends on how much the manager’s effort affects the probability
of the event. If the manager can reduce the probability of the potential recall significantly, it is
optimal to make his payment contingent on its realization.
This paper proposes a theoretical model which introduces asymmetric awareness in the canoni-
cal moral hazard model. The model analyzes the optimal contract between a fully aware principal
and an unaware agent. A decision maker is called unaware when there exist contingencies that he
does not know, and he does not know that he does not know, and so on ad infinitum (Modica and
Rustichini, 1994). In the proposed model, the agent is assumed to be unaware of some relevant
events, which means there are contingencies that affect the agent’s payoff in some states but that
have never crossed his mind. Further, the agent is assumed to be unaware of his unawareness, so
he believes that his description of the world is correct and complete. This implies that the agent is
oblivious to the possibility that the principal is aware of contingencies that he is unaware of. The
principal, on the other hand, is assumed to be fully aware. Moreover, the principal knows that
the agent is unaware and he knows what the agent is unaware of. When writing the contract the
principal can make the agent aware of some or all relevant contingencies.
In line with the standard principal-agent model, the risk-neutral principal proposes a contract
to the risk-averse agent. The principal is the owner of a risky project, whose outcome is a function
of the realization of a finite number of elementary contingencies of which the agent only knows a
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subset. These contingencies can be thought of as elementary propositions that can be either true
or false. The probability of a contingency to be realized depends on the agent’s privately taken
action. The agent’s effort can be high or low and it is assumed that implementing high effort is
always optimal. Since the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort, the terms of the contract
have to be such that it is in the agent’s best interest to exert the level of effort the principal wishes
to implement. The compensation scheme is made contingent on the observable and verifiable out-
come, rewarding the agent for outcome realizations that are relatively likely under high effort. The
agent is assumed to have limited liability, thus transfers have to be non-negative in each state of
the world. If the principal leaves the agent unaware of some contingencies, there is a non-empty set
of possible outcomes that the agent does not take into account. It is optimal for the principal to
construct the contract such that the agent receives the minimal payment whenever an unforeseen
outcome is realized.
The main question this paper addresses is whether and under which conditions the principal
enlarges the agent’s awareness. The rationale for leaving the agent unaware is what I refer to as
the participation effect. If the agent is unaware, his beliefs are systematically biased, which is ex-
ploited by the principal. The principal pays in expectation less than the agent’s reservation utility,
because there is positive probability that he pays zero and because the agent does not take this into
account. The rationale for making the agent aware is what I refer to as the incentive effect. Since
the probability of a contingency to be realized depends on the effort of the agent, including it in
the contract allows the principal to use its realization as a signal about the agent’s action choice.
This implies that the information structure is richer and providing incentives is less costly.
When contemplating the announcement of a contingency the principal faces the following trade-
off. The cost of announcement is the payment to the agent in the states where the respective
contingency is realized. The cost increases with the probability of the unforeseen contingency given
the optimal level of effort. The gain of enhancing the agent’s awareness is a richer information
structure. The gain increases with the informativeness of the signal. The principal includes con-
tingencies in the contract for which the gains outweigh the losses. Roughly speaking, these are
contingencies that are very unlikely but highly informative. The characterization of the trade-off
between participation and incentive effect is the key contribution of this paper.
If the agent is unaware after reading the contract, his perception of the world differs from the
principal’s perception of the world. The question arises as to whether the agent can rationalize the
proposed contract given his beliefs or whether he should get suspicious. To answer this question I
analyze the principal’s optimization problem from the viewpoint of the agent. The solution to this
problem coincides with the proposed contract whenever the principal’s expected profit evaluated at
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the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and the optimal effort choice is the same for both beliefs. Given
these relatively weak conditions, the proposed contract is fully rationalizable for the agent, i.e. the
agent has no reason to become suspicious upon reading the contract. The reason for this is that
the principal uses the signals within the agent’s awareness optimally. Since the agent is unaware
of the existence of other relevant contingencies, the proposed contract maximizes the principal’s
expected payoff given the agent’s beliefs.
Next, I allow for competition among principals. In the benchmark model without unawareness,
principals engage in a Bertrand competition over the compensation scheme. In equilibrium, princi-
pals make zero profits and the whole surplus goes to the agent. I call this equilibrium full awareness
equilibrium. Without requiring the contract to be rationalizable for the agent, the full awareness
equilibrium is the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in my environment. The rationale behind
this result is that principals engage in a Bertrand competition over the compensation scheme for
every level of awareness. Once profits are small enough it is optimal to deviate and reveal another
contingency to the agent in order to capture the whole market. If the contract is required to be
rationalizable for the agent, this equilibrium still exists. It is unique when the number of competing
principals is large enough.
Finally, some generalizations are discussed. Throughout the main part of the analysis I assume
that contingencies are independent of each other. Giving up this assumption the optimal compen-
sation scheme varies with the ratio of perceived to objective probability. Further, I assume that
output is a discrete one-to-one mapping from contingencies to real numbers. I discuss how results
change when more general forms of output functions are considered. Next, the analysis abstracts
from the optimal action choice. I show that whenever the principal wishes to implement low effort,
it is optimal to not reveal any contingencies, because there is no incentive effect. Further, I discuss
the optimal contract when the agent is the residual claimant. There is an additional effect on
the participation constraint because the agent’s evaluation of the project generally depends on his
level of awareness. It is favorable to the principal to disclose negative outcome shocks, because
their revelation lowers the agent’s outside option. Lastly, a frequently raised concern is whether
unawareness is observationally equivalent to full awareness with zero probability beliefs. I discuss
in what sense my model can be interpreted as a standard principal-agent model with heterogeneous
priors.
Section 2 gives an overview of the related literature. Section 3 introduces the theoretical model.
In Section 4 the optimal contract with observable effort is characterized as a benchmark. The main
part of the paper, Section 5, is devoted to the analysis of the optimal contract with unobservable
effort. I proceed in two steps: First, I characterize the optimal compensation scheme for a given
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revelation strategy. Second, I analyze the optimal revelation strategy and examine the basic trade-
off between participation and incentives. Section 6 introduces competition among principals and
Section 7 discusses generalizations of the basic model. Section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
All proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
It is not possible to incorporate non-trivial unawareness in the standard state space model. This
has been shown in the seminal paper by Dekel et al. (1998). In response, Heifetz et al. (2006), Li
(2009), Board and Chung (2011) and Galanis (2011) have proposed generalized state space models
that do allow for non-trivial unawareness. My model adopts the generalized state space model
introduced by Heifetz et al. (2006). Their unawareness structure consists of a lattice of state
spaces, ordered according to their expressive power, where each state space captures a particular
horizon of propositions. In a companion work Heifetz et al. (2011) introduce probabilistic beliefs
to the model. For ease of exposition, my model foregoes the formal introduction of state spaces,
projections among them and events. Appendix A.1 explains how the basic model is built on the
unawareness structure proposed by Heifetz et al. (2006/2011).
Filiz-Ozbay (2012) was one of the first to incorporate unawareness into contracting problems.
She considers a contracting situation between a fully aware insurer and an unaware insuree. The
key difference between my work and her paper is the presence of moral hazard and the assumption
on beliefs. In Filiz-Ozbay (2012) there is no hidden action and consequently no incentive effect,
which implies that her set up restricts my framework to the case where the agent is the residual
claimant and the revelation of new states involves a participation effect only. However, Filiz-Ozbay
(2012) allows for a wider range of equilibrium beliefs. She assumes that the agent assigns arbi-
trary probability beliefs to newly revealed states with the restriction that the principal’s payoff
evaluated at the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and that relative probability beliefs previously held
are unchanged. Given this assumption, it is possible that the agent’s beliefs deviate stronger from
objective probabilities when becoming aware than before. Due to the insurance motive and the
wider range of equilibrium beliefs, the effect of revelation on the participation constraint in her
environment is ambiguous. Depending on the effect on the participation constraint disclosure can
be profitable or not. Also Ozbay (2008) analyzes a setting where the decision maker is unaware of
some events and a fully aware announcer strategically mentions contingencies before the decision
maker takes an action. Both Filiz-Ozbay (2012) and Ozbay (2008) explore the possibility that the
unaware agent is able to reason why the other agent proposed the observed contract.
A second strand of literature analyzes contracting problems with unawareness of actions. In
these models agents are aware of all of nature’s moves but are unaware of their own action space.
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Von Thadden and Zhao (2011 and 2012) propose a moral hazard model with a fully aware principal
and an unaware agent. At first glance this set up may seem similar to mine, however the underlying
intuition and the results are very distinct. In contrast to my model, the agent in their model under-
stands all relevant contingencies but is unaware of his own action space. Von Thadden and Zhao
(2012) assume that if the principal leaves the agent unaware, the agent chooses some default action
unconsciously, but assesses his expected utility with respect to such default action correctly. The
principal decides whether to make the agent aware of his own action space or whether to leave him
unaware. In a standard moral hazard framework this can be interpreted as the decision whether to
restrict the agent’s action choice to some sub-optimal level ex-ante or whether to leave the action
choice to the agent’s discretion. Making the agent aware enlarges the agent’s action space and
consequently relaxes the participation constraint. However, enlarging the agent’s action space adds
further incentive constraints to the principal’s optimization problem. Consequently, the principal
faces a trade off between participation and incentives, but the effects are reversed compared to my
model. Their main result is, that it is optimal to leave the agent unaware whenever the default
action is close enough to the first best effort level. Also Zhao (2008) considers a moral hazard
problem with unawareness of actions and default actions. In his set-up both the principal and the
agent can be unaware of their action space.
Finally, this work is related to the literature on moral hazard and heterogeneous priors. Santos-
Pinto (2008) analyzes a principal-agent model with an agent that holds wrong beliefs about the
impact of his effort and calls such biased beliefs self-image. He shows that if positive self-image
and effort are complements, the impact of positive self-image is favorable to the principal.1 If
unawareness in my model is interpreted as assigning probability zero to certain outcomes, the
resulting distribution does not satisfy the imposed restrictions in Santos-Pinto (2008). Consequently
his results do not apply in my framework.2 Also De la Rosa (2011) analyzes a moral hazard problem
with overconfidence.
1The agent is said to have a positive self-image, whenever there is first-order stochastic dominance of the agent’s
perceived distribution over the actual distribution for any action. He defines effort and self-image as complements if
first-order stochastic dominance is stronger for high effort than for low effort.
2In my set up the agent implicitly has a positive self-image if he is unaware of outcome decreasing contingencies. If
I assume that the true distribution conditional on high effort first-order stochastically dominates the true distribution
conditional on low effort and that the agent is unaware of negative outcome shocks only, unawareness implies that
effort and positive self-image are substitutes instead of complements. This is because first-order stochastic dominance
implies that the probability of low outcomes is more likely under low than high effort. Unawareness implicitly implies
that the agent assign probability zero to some of these outcomes given high and low effort. Thus, the agent’s beliefs
deviate stronger for low than high effort.
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3 The Model
There are two individuals involved in the contracting problem: A principal and an agent. The
principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. The agent receives utility from monetary
transfers C and disutility from effort e. I assume that the utility function is separable in money
and effort: U(C, e) = υ(C)− e, where υ satisfies the Inada conditions. Effort can take two possible
values e ∈ {eL, eH}, where eL < eH .
The uncertainty of the environment is captured by a finite set of elementary contingencies,
denoted by Θ. A contingency θ ∈ Θ is a random variable with realizations 0 and 1. It can be
thought of as an elementary proposition that can be either true or false. The probability of θ = 1
depends on the effort of the agent, denoted by e. Throughout the main part of the analysis it will
be assumed that, given e, the contingencies in Θ are conditionally independent of each other.
Assumption 1 The random variables θ and θ′ are conditionally independent given e, for any
θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Awareness Structure: Unlike in the standard moral hazard problem, the agent is unaware of
some contingencies. The subset the agent is aware of is denoted by ΘA ⊂ Θ. The principal is aware
of the entire set Θ. Further, he knows that the agent is unaware and he knows which contingencies
the agent is unaware of. The agent is unaware of his unawareness and is unaware of the principal’s
superior awareness. When the principal writes the contract he can enlarge the agent’s awareness by
mentioning contingencies in the contract, denoted by X ⊆ Θ\ΘA. The agent updates his awareness
and considers henceforth the contingencies in the set Θ̂ = ΘA ∪X.
State Spaces: A state of the world in this environment can be thought of as a sequence of 0’s
and 1’s of length |Θ| that specifies the realization of each θ ∈ Θ. Let S denote the collection of
these sequences. Since the agent is unaware of some contingencies, he does not perceive the actual
state space but a less expressive one. A state in the agent’s subjective state space can be thought of
as a sequence of 0’s and 1’s of length |ΘA| < |Θ| that specifies the realization of each θ ∈ Θ̂. Let Ŝ
denote the collection of these sequences. For example, let Θ = {θ1, θ2} and Θ̂ = {θ1}. Objectively
there are four states of the world S = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, but the agent only perceives two
Ŝ = {(0), (1)}. The set of contingencies the agent is aware of determines the dimension of his
subjective state space. Disclosing a contingency in the contract implies adding another dimension
to his subjective state space.
Outcomes: There is a project with stochastic outcome Y , which is observable and verifiable.
Outcome is a function of the contingencies in Θ. Since state s ∈ S specifies the realization of each
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contingency θ ∈ Θ, we can define outcome realization y directly as a function of the state s ∈ S:
y = f(s), s ∈ S.
Let Y denote the range of function f . Since the agent does not know the whole set Θ and conse-
quently does not know the objective state space, he cannot know Y. Instead he perceives outcome
as a function of the contingencies he is aware of, i.e. a mapping from his subjective state space to
R. I assume that the agent’s perceived outcome is equivalent to the objective outcome when the
contingencies the agent is unaware of are not realized, denoted by θ = 0. Note that θ = 0 can refer
to an elementary proposition being true or false.3 A way to think about this assumption is that
there are events that the agent has never observed and that have never crossed his mind. Instead,
the agent has some implicit assumptions about the underlying state of the world, but is unaware
of these implicit assumptions (Li, 2008). Consequently, he cannot imagine a world in which a
proposition implicitly assumed to be true (false) turns out to be false (true). This assumption is
prevalent in the literature of unawareness.4
The agent’s outcome function is
y = f̂(s), s ∈ Ŝ.
where f̂(s) = f(s, 0, 0, 0, ...), s ∈ Ŝ.5 Let Ŷ denote the range of function ŷ.
Assumption 2 |Y| = 2|Θ|.
A2 imposes that outcome differs across every state of the world, which implies that the agent
knows a subset of possible outcomes whenever he is not fully aware, Ŷ ⊂ Y. The assumption
that f is a one-to-one function is important for tractability of the characterization of the trade-off
between participation and incentives.6 More general outcome functions are discussed in Section 7.2.
Probability Measures: Let pi(y|e) denote the probability of y ∈ Y given effort e and assume
pi(y|e) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y. The distribution over Y is known to the principal. The agent is assumed to
have correct beliefs over the distribution of contingencies within his awareness. So if the agent is
aware of θ ∈ Θ, but unaware of θ′ ∈ Θ, he assesses the probability of contingency θ to be realized
3For example, if a decision maker is unaware of the concept of gravity and θ is the elementary statement that there
is gravity, then θ = 0 means that the elementary statement is true. Similarly, if a decision maker is unaware of global
warming and θ is the elementary statement that there is global warming, then θ = 0 means that the elementary
statement is false.
4See for example Modica et al. (1998) and Heifetz et al. (2011).
5Assume that any sequence s ∈ S is ordered such that s = {s′, s′′}, with s′ ∈ Ŝ.
6A2 implies that disclosing contingencies allows the principal to use a more informative outcome distribution, which
implies that the effect of disclosure on incentives is always positive. If this assumption is given up, the incentive effect
is ambiguous.
8
correctly. This implies that he assigns the correct conditional probability to every y ∈ Ŷ given
that none of the unforeseen contingencies are realized. Under the assumption of independence the
probability that θ = 0 for all θ 6∈ Θ̂ is constant across all y ∈ Ŷ. Let Π(Θ̂|e) :=
∏
θ 6∈Θ̂
Pr[θ = 0|e]
denote the probability that y ∈ Ŷ. Then the agent assigns probability
pi(y|e) :=
pi(y|e)
Π(Θ̂|e)
, y ∈ Ŷ,
to outcome y ∈ Ŷ conditional on effort e.7
The Contract: As in the standard principal agent problem, effort is assumed to be non-
observable; thus, the principal offers a contract based on the observable and verifiable Y . The
distribution of Y depends on the effort of the agent. It is assumed that E[Y |eH ] > E[Y |eL] and
that E[Y |eH ] − E[Y |eL] is large enough, so that it is always optimal to induce high effort. This
allows us to abstract the analysis from the choice of effort. In Section 7.3 the optimal action choice
will be discussed. The agent is assumed to have limited liability; thus, the outcome contingent
compensation C is non-negative for all y ∈ Y.
Definition 1 A contract is a pair (Θ̂, C) with ΘA ⊆ Θ̂ ⊆ Θ and C : Y −→ R
+
0 .
Let (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) denote the contract that maximizes the principal’s expected payoff. Following Filiz-
Ozbay (2012), we can introduce a notion of incompleteness.
Definition 2 A contract (Θ̂, C) is incomplete if Θ̂ 6= Θ. Otherwise it is complete.
Now suppose the contract is incomplete, so that Y\Ŷ is non-empty. The principal can construct
the contract such that he pays zero to the agent when an unforeseen level of outcome is realized,
e.g. by finding a functional form of the compensation scheme on Y satisfying zero payments for
all y ∈ Y\Ŷ or by including a ”zero payment otherwise” clause in the contract. I will abstract
from the question of how the principal can implement zero payments in the unforeseen states, but
analyze a reduced form of this model. Zero payments at y ∈ Y\Ŷ are optimal because any positive
payment in these states will leave the agent’s expected utility unaffected, but make the principal
strictly worse off. It is important to note that zero payments facilitate notation considerably, but
that the results hold for any other minimal payment as long as it is low enough.8 Thus, the optimal
contract in this environment can be interpreted as a contract that promises a fixed payment and
that rewards the agent with boni for certain outcomes. Whenever a contingency is realized that is
not anticipated by the agent, the bonus is not paid.
7Generally one can depart from the assumption that the agent assigns correct probabilities to events within his
awareness and allow for a wider range of beliefs. This adds effects of heterogeneous beliefs or ambiguity to the
problem.
8Low enough means that the minimal payment constraint is not binding for outcomes within the agent’s awareness.
Otherwise the trade-off for the respective outcomes changes.
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Expected Payoffs: The principal’s outside option in the case of rejection is assumed to be zero.
His expected payoff is given by
EUP =
{ ∑
y∈Y pi(y|e) [y − C(y)] if the agent accepts,
0 if the agent rejects.
The agent assesses his expected utility with respect to his restricted state space. The outside option
of rejecting the contract is U¯ :
EUA =
{ ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ (C (ŷ))− e if the agent accepts,
U if the agent rejects.
4 The Optimal Contract with Observable Effort
In order to have a benchmark it is useful to first characterize the contract when effort is observable.
If effort is observable and verifiable the contract can be made directly contingent on the action of
the agent. The principal solves the problem:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH) [y − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (C(y))− eH ≥ U
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y.
We know that when the contract is complete it is optimal to give the agent full insurance. This
can be seen from the first order conditions
1
υ′(C(y))
= λ, ∀y ∈ Y.
The agent receives CFB = υ−1
(
U¯ + eH
)
independent of the realization of Y . The first best is
achieved. Now suppose the principal leaves the agent unaware of some contingencies. The first
order conditions for C(y), y ∈ Ŷ are
1
υ′(C(y))
= λ
1
Π(Θ̂|eH)
.
The first-order conditions imply that the transfer across y ∈ Ŷ is constant. The optimal compen-
sation scheme is simply Ĉ∗(y) = CFB, ∀y ∈ Ŷ and Ĉ∗(y) = 0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ. The expected payment to
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the agent is Π(Θ̂|eH)CFB. It is minimized when the probability of paying, Π(Θ̂|eH), is minimized,
which is achieved when the agent’s awareness level is lowest. Consequently, if effort is observable,
it is optimal to reveal nothing to the agent.
Proposition 4.1 Under A1, A2 and observable effort, Θ̂∗ = ΘA.
The reason for result 4.1 is that disclosing contingencies to the agent makes the participation
constraint more costly to satisfy. Since effort is observable there is no incentive effect and only the
participation effect matters.
5 The Optimal Contract with Unobservable Effort
Under unobservable effort the principal maximizes his expected profit subject to the participation
constraint, the incentive constraint and the limited liability constraints. The participation con-
straint assures that the agent accepts the contract. The incentive constraint leads the agent to
exert high effort eH . The principal solves:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH) [y − C(y)] (1)
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (C (y))− eH ≥ U (2)
eH ∈ argmax
e
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ (C (y))− e
 (3)
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y, (4)
where (2) is the participation constraint, (3) is the incentive constraint and (4) is the limited
liability constraint. The analysis of the optimal contract can be divided into two steps. In step one
the principal chooses the optimal compensation scheme Ĉ given announcement Θ̂. In step two he
chooses the optimal level of awareness Θ̂.
5.1 Step 1: Optimal Compensation Scheme given Awareness Θ̂
The optimal compensation scheme given awareness Θ̂ is characterized by (2), (3) and the necessary
condition
1
υ′(C(y))
=
1
Π(Θ̂|eH)
(
λ+ γ
[
1−
pi
(
y|eL
)
pi (y|eH)
])
, ∀y ∈ Ŷ, (5)
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as well as C(y) = 0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ.9 Note that the optimal compensation scheme varies with the
likelihood ratio pi(y|e
L)
pi(y|eH)
of the restricted information structure Θ̂ instead of Θ. Since the agent is
unaware of the contingencies in Θ\Θ̂, these signals cannot be used to induce eH . As in the standard
moral-hazard problem both participation and incentive constraint hold with equality. Let Ĉ denote
the solution to this system of equations.
Lemma 5.1 Assume A1 and A2. Under Ĉ, both λ > 0 and γ > 0.
Proof See Appendix A.2.2.
The optimal compensation scheme Ĉ(·) across y ∈ Ŷ coincides with the the optimal com-
pensation scheme of the standard principal-agent model with symmetric awareness and restricted
information structure Θ̂. To see this suppose for a moment that Ŝ is the objective state space and
that both, the principal and the agent, are symmetrically aware of Ŝ. Then the principal solves
min
C(·)
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)C(y) (6)
subject to (2) and (3). Let CC
Θ̂
denote the solution to this problem. CC
Θ̂
is the optimal complete
contract under symmetric awareness and information structure Θ̂. Under asymmetric awareness,
the expected payment to the agent is∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH)C(y) = Π(Θ̂|eH)
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)C(y)− (1−Π(Θ̂)) · 0,
which is equivalent to (6) except for the scaling factor Π(Θ̂|eH). Since Π(Θ̂|eH) is nothing but a
constant for a given Θ̂, the two optimization problems are equivalent and Ĉ(y) = CC
Θ̂
(y) for all
y ∈ Ŷ. The expected profit of the optimal incomplete contract is simply the expected payment of
CC
Θ̂
weighted by the probability that none of the unforeseen contingencies are realized:
E[Ĉ(Y )|eH ] = Π(Θ̂|eH)E[CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH ].
5.2 Step 2: Optimal Awareness Θ̂∗
The optimal level of disclosure is characterized by identifying the basic trade off between partici-
pation and incentives of disclosing contingencies to the agent. To separate the effect on incentives
from the effect on participation, it is useful to compare the expected payment of complete contracts
under different information structures.
9Inada conditions assure that (4) is not binding for C(y), y ∈ Ŷ.
12
Lemma 5.2 Let Z be a non-empty subset of Θ\Θ̂. Then
∆CZ
Θ̂
:= E
[
CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH
]
− E
[
CC
Θ̂∪Z
(Y )|eH
]
≥ 0,
with strict inequality if and only if ∃θ ∈ Z such that Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL].
Proof See Appendix A.2.3.
This result is in line with Holmstro¨m’s Sufficient Statistic Theorem (1979), which states that a
signal θ is valuable if and only if it is informative.10 Valuable means that both principal and agent
can be made better off by including θ or simply that agency costs are reduced. Under independence
θ is informative if and only if Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL].
5.2.1 The Basic Trade-Off
To understand the effect on participation and incentives of disclosing a subset of Θ\ΘA, compare
the expected payoff of the principal under ΘA and Θ̂ ⊃ ΘA:
Π(ΘA|e
H)E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
≷ Π(Θ̂|eH)E
[
CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH
]
, (7)
or simply11 ∏
θ∈X
Pr
[
θ = 0 | eH
]
E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
≷ E
[
CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH
]
.
Using ∆CXΘA = E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
−E
[
CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH
]
we can restate (7) in terms of gains and losses of
revealing set X:
∆CXΘA ≷
(
1−
∏
θ∈X
Pr
[
θ = 0|eH
])
E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
. (8)
∆CXΘA is the incentive gain of disclosing set X. The announcement of an informative contingency
allows the principal to use the contingency as a signal about the agent’s effort. Disclosing an infor-
mative contingency to the agent consequently relaxes the incentive constraint and the information
gain is captured by ∆CXΘA . (1 −
∏
θ∈X Pr[θ = 0|e
H ])E[CCΘA(Y )|e
H ] is the participation loss of
disclosing X. With probability 1 −
∏
θ∈X Pr
[
θ = 0|eH
]
one of the contingencies in X is realized.
Under announcement ΘA ∪ X the principal has to pay the agent a positive wage, whereas under
ΘA he pays zero. Disclosing a contingency to the agent consequently tightens the participation
10Holmstro¨m (1979) shows this for continuous outcome and continuous effort.
11Remember that Θ̂ = ΘA ∪X.
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constraint. Under observable effort there is no incentive effect, which is why it is optimal to keep
the agent unaware. Under unobservable effort the principal chooses Θ̂ such that the net gain of
revelation is maximized. Since Θ is finite, he compares a finite number of announcement strategies
and their respective expected payoffs. Whenever there exists a Θ̂ such that the incentive effect
outweighs the participation effect, the principal enlarges the agent’s awareness. Whether this is the
case or not generally depends on the exogenous parameters of the model.
5.2.2 Single Announcements
To find some conditions on the trade-off in (8) it useful to first analyze one step deviations from set
ΘA. Consider the announcement of θ 6∈ ΘA and define ∆
θ :=
∣∣Pr[θ = 1|eH ]− Pr[θ = 1|eL]∣∣. ∆θ is
a measure of informativeness of signal θ. The larger ∆θ the more informative is the realization of
θ about the effort of the agent. Let V
Θ̂
:= E[CC
Θ̂
(Y )|eH ] denote the principal’s expected payment
to the agent given full awareness, restricted information structure Θ̂ and optimal compensation
scheme CC
Θ̂
. V
Θ̂
is decreasing in the informativeness of signals θ ∈ Θ̂ due to decreasing agency
costs.
Lemma 5.3 Assume A1 and A2. V
Θ̂
is monotonically decreasing in ∆θ, ∀θ ∈ Θ̂.
Proof See Appendix A.2.4
Figure 1: Trade-Off
Incentive
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Pr[Θ=1|e  ]Π 1
0 Θ
Participation
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Lemma 5.3 allows us to find conditions on the trade-off between participation and incentives for
single announcements. Consider the trade-off of disclosing θ, illustrated in Figure 1:12
∆CθΘA vs. Pr
[
θ = 1|eH
]
E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
.
The incentive gain ∆CθΘA = E[C
C
ΘA
]−E[CCΘA∪θ] as a function of Pr[θ = 1|e
H ] is illustrated by the
blue curve. It is decreasing on [0,Pr[θ = 1|eL]) and increasing on (Pr[θ = 1, eL], 1]. To see this,
note that E[CCΘA ] is independent of the distributional properties of θ and E[C
C
ΘA∪θ
] is decreasing in
∆θ (Lemma 5.3). At Pr[θ = 1|eL] signal θ is uninformative and ∆CθΘA = 0. The participation loss
Pr
[
θ = 1|eH
]
E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
is illustrated by the red line. It is linearly increasing in Pr[θ = 1|eH ].
Figure 1 shows that if probability Pr[θ = 1|eH ] is small enough, the incentive gain outweighs
the participation loss. To see that this is generally the case, note that
lim
Pr[θ=1|eH ]→0
∆CθΘA = E[C
C
ΘA
(Y )|eH ]− CFB > 0,
lim
Pr[θ=1|eH ]→0
Pr
[
θ = 1|eH
]
E
[
CCΘA(Y )|e
H
]
= 0.
Hence, for Pr[θ = 1|eH ] close to zero the incentive gain is strictly greater than the participation loss,
whereas for Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ = 1|eL] the incentive gain is strictly smaller than the participation
loss. Since the incentive gain is monotonically decreasing on (0,Pr[θ = 1|eL]) and the participation
loss is linearly increasing on (0,Pr[θ = 1|eL]), we know that there is a threshold on that interval,
such that the incentive effect outweighs the participation effect whenever Pr[θ = 1|eH ] is smaller
than this threshold.
Proposition 5.4 Assume A1 and A2. For every θ ∈ Θ\ΘA there exists a threshold pi
θ ∈ (0,Pr[θ =
1|eL]) such that if Pr[θ = 1|eH ] < piθ, the incentive effect outweighs the participation effect.
Proof Omitted.
Note that if there exists a contingency θ outside the agent’s awareness such that Pr[θ = 1|eH ] < piθ
the principal strictly prefers to reveal θ to the agent than to reveal nothing.
5.2.3 Combined Announcements
In the previous section I characterized the gains and losses of revealing a contingency θ for a given
set ΘA. When the agent is unaware of more than one contingency the trade-off associated with the
12This figure shows ∆CθΘA and Pr[θ = 1|e
H ]E[CCΘA(Y )|e
H ] for the following specification: υ(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ
, σ =
0.5, eH = 1, eL = 0, U¯ = 5. There are two contingencies. Contingency θ ∈ ΘA with Pr[θ = 1|e
H ] = 0.65 and
Pr[θ = 1|eL] = 0.5 and contingency θ′ 6∈ ΘA with Pr[θ
′ = 1|eL] = 0.5.
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revelation of one of these contingencies generally depends on the revelation of other contingencies.
To see how the trade-off changes as other contingencies are revealed I consider the special case of
symmetric contingencies. I specify conditions under which the net gain of making the agent aware
decreases in the number of contingencies revealed. A decreasing net gain implies that whenever
the revelation of any single contingency yields a negative net gain, a combined revelation cannot
be profitable. With this, it is straight forward to find the optimal set of revelation Θ̂∗.
Suppose the agent is unaware of N symmetric contingencies, Θ\ΘA = {θ1, ..., θN}, where sym-
metric means that every contingency has the same distribution. Let α := Pr[θi = 0|e
H ], i = 1, ...N
and Θ̂n := ΘA ∪ θ1 ∪ ... ∪ θn.
13 The net gain of revealing the nth contingency is:
NG(θn) := α
N−n
(
∆Cθn
Θ̂n−1
− (1− α)E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]
)
.
The value of NG(θn) is determined by two factors. First, there is the difference between incentive
gain and participation loss as we saw in the previous section. This difference is weighted by
the probability that the gains and losses are realized, αN−n. Note that both ∆Cθn
Θ̂n−1
and (1 −
α)E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ] are decreasing in n, whereas αN−n is exponentially increasing in n. Figure 2(a)
shows the weighted incentive gain αN−n∆Cθn
Θ̂n−1
and the weighted participation loss αN−n(1 −
α)E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ] as a function of n. Generally, NG(θn) can decrease or increase in n.
Lemma 5.5 Assume A1, A2 and symmetric contingencies. NG(θn) is decreasing in n if
E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]2 < E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ] for all n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}. (9)
Proof See Appendix A.2.5
The intuitive interpretation of condition (9) is that the expected payment of the complete contract
CC
Θ̂n
as a function of n is sufficiently convex, i.e. the inclusion of signal θn in the information struc-
ture reduces agency costs strongly when n is small but only marginally when n is large. Condition
(9) implies that disclosing θn+1 yields a lower net gain than disclosing θn, depicted in Figure 2(b).
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If condition (9) holds, it is possible to determine the optimal level of revelation Θ̂∗. First, note
that the net gain of any set Z = {θn¯, θn¯+1, ..., θn¯+z} is equal to the sum over individual net gains
NG(θn), n = n¯, ..., n¯+ z.
NG(Z) = αN−(n¯−1)E[CC
Θ̂n¯−1
(Y )|eH ]− αN−(n¯+z)E[CC
Θ̂n¯+z
(Y )|eH ] =
n¯+z∑
n=n¯
NG(θn).
13For notational convenience let Θ̂0 = ΘA.
14Condition (9) is satisfied, for example when υ(C) = C
1−σ
1−σ
, σ = 0.5, eH = 1, eL = 0, U¯ = 9, N = 5, α = 0.6 and
Pr[θ = 0|eL] = Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = 0.5.
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Figure 2: Trade-Off θn
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(a) Weighted Incentive Gain and Participation Loss
of Revealing θn
Net Gain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
n
(b) Net Gain of Revealing θn
Profits are maximized when the net gain of revelation
∑n∗
n=1NG(θn) is maximized. This is achieved
by including all contingencies θn such that NG(θn) ≥ 0.
Corollary 5.6 Assume A1, A2 and symmetric contingencies. If condition (9) is satisfied and if
NG(θN ) < 0, the optimal announcement Θ̂
∗ is Θ̂n∗, where n
∗ is such that
NG(θn∗) ≥ 0 and NG(θn∗+1) < 0.
Otherwise Θ̂∗ = Θ.
Proof Omitted.
5.3 Justifiability of the Contract
If the contract is incomplete, the agent’s perception of the world differs from the principal’s. An
important question is whether the proposed contract can elicit suspicion on the side of the agent.
When receiving a contract the agent may ask herself whether announcement Θ̂ and compensation
scheme C maximizes the principal’s payoff. The agent can only contemplate contracts within
his awareness. These are contracts that specify any Θ˜,ΘA ⊆ Θ˜ ⊆ Θ̂ and any C ∈ R
+
0 for all
y ∈ Ŷ. Filiz-Ozbay (2012) introduces an equilibrium refinement, which requires that the equilibrium
contract maximizes the principal’s expected payoff from the viewpoint of the agent. In line with
her equilibrium refinement, I define justifiability of a contract as follows.
Definition 3 A contract (Θ̂, C) is called justifiable if it is a solution to the optimization problem
max
Θ˜⊆Θ̂,C(·),e
EUAP :=
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e) [y − C(y)]
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subject to (2), (3) and C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Ŷ.
EUAP is the expected payoff of the principal evaluated at the agent’s beliefs. Definition 3 requires
contract (Θ̂, C) to be optimal for the principal from the viewpoint of the agent. It turns out that
under relatively mild conditions the optimal contract (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) indeed maximizes the principal’s
payoff evaluated at the agent’s beliefs.
Proposition 5.7 Assume A1 and A2. (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is justifiable according to Definition 3 if and only
if EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ 0 and EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL).
Proof See Appendix A.2.6.
A necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal contract to be justifiable is that the principal’s
expected utility is non-negative and that eH is the optimal action choice from the viewpoint of
the agent. Up to now the optimization problem was disconnected from the actual outcome levels
in Y because only the likelihood ratio associated with each outcome level is relevant for the in-
duction of eH . If we require the contract to be justifiable, this is no longer necessarily the case.
Whenever the optimal contract is incomplete, the agent perceives only a subset of possible out-
comes. It is possible that the optimal contract leaves the agent unaware of high outcomes such
that EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) < 0 whereas EUP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ 0. Similarly, it is possible that the optimal
contract leaves the agent unaware of outcomes that are strongly correlated with effort such that
EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL) whereas EUP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL). If any of the
two conditions in Proposition 5.7 is violated, the refinement introduces another dimension in the
trade-off. The principal is no longer only concerned with the distributional properties of the con-
tingencies in Θ\ΘA, but also with the outcomes an announcement reveals.
Given that the expected profit evaluated at the agent’s beliefs is non-negative and higher at eH
than at eL, the optimal contract (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is justifiable. Justifiability of Ĉ∗ is straight forward. If
the optimal contract is complete, principal and agent share the same belief. Hence, Ĉ∗ maximizes
the principal’s expected payoff from the agent’s perspective. If the optimal contract is incomplete,
we know that the transfer rule for outcomes within the agent’s awareness coincides with the op-
timal compensation scheme of the complete contract given information structure Θ̂. Since the
agent thinks that the contract is complete, Ĉ∗ solves the principal’s optimization problem given
the agent’s beliefs.
To see justifiability of Θ̂∗, remember that the agent can only consider the announcement of
contingencies within his awareness. Suppose ΘA ⊂ Θ̂
∗. The agent evaluates the principal’s ex-
pected payoff for every announcement Θ̂∗\Z, where Z ∈ Θ̂∗\ΘA. The agent knows that given
announcement Θ̂∗\Z the optimal compensation scheme is C(y) = CC
Θ̂∗\Z
(y) for all y within the
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agent’s hypothetical awareness Θ̂∗\Z and zero otherwise. Thus, after reading the contract, the
agent understands the principal’s optimal contract for any level of awareness lower or equal than
his actual awareness, but he does not understand that there may remain contingencies that he is
unaware of. For Θ̂∗ to be justifiable it has to be true that
E
[
CC
Θ̂∗
(Y )|eH
]
≤
∏
θ∈Θ̂∗\Z
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]E
[
CC
Θ̂∗\Z
(Y )|eH
]
, (10)
for any Z ⊆ Θ̂∗\ΘA. This coincides with the optimality condition of the principal. Consequently,
(10) is fulfilled and Θ̂∗ can be rationalized by the agent.
6 Competing Principals
In the basic set-up I analyze the optimization problem of a monopolistic principal. This section
addresses the question of how these results change when principals compete against each other.
Suppose there are N principals that are all aware of Θ. They make simultaneous offers, denoted
by (Θ̂i, Ci), i = 1, ..., N . The agent updates his awareness after hearing all of the offers and accepts
at most one. He considers henceforth every contingency in Θ̂1 ∪ ...∪ Θ̂N . If the agent is indifferent
between two or more contracts he accepts each contract with equal probability. I focus on symmetric
equilibria in pure strategies, (Θ̂i, Ci) = (Θ̂, C), i = 1, ..., N . Principal i
′s payoff function is
EUi =
1
N
(
E[Y |eH ]− E[C(Y )|eH ]
)
, i = 1, ..., N.
In the absence of asymmetric awareness, principals engage in a Bertrand competition over transfer
rule C. The second-best allocation is achieved, where principals make zero profits and the surplus
goes to the agent. Let C∗ denote the equilibrium compensation scheme under full awareness.
Proposition 6.1 Assume A1 and A2 and assume that the second-best surplus is strictly positive.
There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which the agent is fully aware and each principal
offers the complete zero profit contract (Θ, C∗).
Proof See Appendix A.2.7.
The intuition for Proposition 6.1 is that whenever the announcements of the other principals
promote full awareness the own announcement is not payoff relevant. Further, any change in the
compensation scheme yields either negative or zero expected profits for the standard Bertrand
competition argument. Thus, the equilibrium exist. The reason for the equilibrium to be unique
is simply that for any level of awareness, principals engage in a Bertrand competition over the
compensation scheme. As profits become small enough it is profitable to deviate and enlarge the
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agent’s awareness. This deviation allows the deviator to capture the whole market and make pos-
itive profits, because the agent recognizes the zero payments of the other contracts in the newly
revealed states.
When we require the contract to be justifiable according to Definition 3, the symmetric zero
profits Nash equilibrium is no longer necessarily unique. Suppose each principal announces Θ̂i =
Θ̂ ⊂ Θ, i = 1, ...N and offers compensation Ci = Ĉ, i = 1, ..., N such that the agent’s utility is
maximized across the states the agent is aware of, the incentive constraint is satisfied and the
expected payoff of the principals from the viewpoint of the agent is equal to zero:∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)[y − Ĉ(y)] = 0.
The agent believes that he receives an expected transfer of
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)Ĉ(y), whereas the actual
expected transfer is Π(Θ̂|eH)E[Ĉ(Y )|eH ]. Note that Π(Θ̂|eH)E[Ĉ(Y )|eH ] is strictly smaller than∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)Ĉ(y), because the agent does not take into account the zero payments in y ∈ Y\Ŷ.
Consequently, it is possible that (Θ̂, Ĉ) yields a positive expected payoff for all principals:
EUi =
1
N
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|e)[y − Ĉ(y)] > 0.
To see that (Θ̂, Ĉ) can be indeed an equilibrium contract, note that any deviation in the compen-
sation scheme Ci either makes the agent worse off or makes the contract non-justifiable according
to Definition 3. A joint deviation in Θ̂i and Ci, allows principal i to capture the whole market.
Whether this deviation yields a higher expected payoff than offering (Θ̂, Ĉ) depends on the number
of principals among other parameters of the model. The larger the number of principals, the smaller
is the expected profit when no one is deviating. This implies that we can find an N large enough
such that deviating is always profitable until the agent is fully aware.
Proposition 6.2 Assume A1 and A2, assume that the second-best surplus is strictly positive and
assume that the agent rejects any non-justifiable contract according to Definition 3. There exists a
critical N¯ ∈ N, such that for every N > N¯ in equilibrium the agent is fully aware.
Proof See Appendix A.2.8.
The result that competition promotes awareness if the number of competitors is large enough was
first shown by Filiz-Ozbay (2012). The line of argument is essentially the same. The profit of each
principal in a symmetric equilibrium with unawareness decreases with the number of principals.
Enlarging the agent’s awareness in Filiz-Ozbay’s (2012) environment implies changing the beliefs
of the agent, which allows the deviator to capture the whole market. Hence, whenever the number
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of principals is large enough, revealing new states to the agent is profitable and in equilibrium the
agent is fully aware.
In contrast to my result, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) propose a model where unawareness prevails
even under intense competition. In their model firms compete for consumers of whom some are
fully aware and the others are unaware. Firms can educate a fraction of the unaware consumers,
but they have no incentive to do so. The reason is that aware consumers profit from the existence
of unaware consumers, so whenever an unaware agent is made aware by a competing firm he has
no incentives to switch, because he profits from the remaining unaware consumers.
7 Discussion
7.1 Dependence between Contingencies
Throughout the main part of the analysis it is assumed that contingencies are conditionally in-
dependent of each other. Giving up this assumption, unawareness has an additional effect on the
optimal compensation scheme. To see this, consider first the case of observable effort. When Θ̂ 6= Θ,
the necessary condition is
1
υ′(C(y))
= λ
pi(y|eH)
pi(y|eH)
, ∀y ∈ Ŷ.
pi(y|eH)
pi(y|eH)
is the ratio of the agent’s perceived probability to the objective probability. Under con-
ditional dependence this ratio depends on y, because the probability that none of the unforeseen
contingencies are realized varies across y ∈ Ŷ. It is optimal to promise a high payment at y if
the probability that one of the unforeseen contingencies is realized is relatively high, because the
probability that the principal has to keep his promise is relatively low. This makes a deviation
from the optimal risk sharing rule profitable. Since the agent cannot rationalize a non-constant
compensation scheme, such a contract is not justifiable according to Definition 3.
When effort is not observable, the first order condition is
1
υ′(C(y))
=
pi(y|eH)
pi(y|eH)
{
λ+ γ
[
1−
pi(y|eL)
pi(y|eH)
]}
, ∀y ∈ Ŷ.
It shows that there are two sources of variation in the optimal compensation scheme Ĉ across
y ∈ Ŷ. First, Ĉ varies with the ratio of perceived to objective probability just as in the case of
observable effort. The second source of variation comes from the agent’s perceived likelihood ratio
as in the basic model. Again, the agent cannot rationalize the first source of variation and the
optimal contract is not necessarily justifiable according to Definition 3. If we require the contract
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to be justifiable, the optimal compensation scheme ignores the variation in the probability of y ∈ Ŷ
and is equivalent to (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) under conditional independence.
7.2 The Output Function
In the basic model, output is discrete and differs across every state of the world. If y is not one-to-
one and contingencies are not observable, both participation loss and incentive gain of revelation
are affected. The participation loss is generally diminished, because the revelation of an unforeseen
contingency does not necessarily imply the revelation of an unforeseen outcome. The incentive
gain is no longer unambiguous, because the agent’s perceived distribution of outcome can be more
informative about the agent’s effort than the actual distribution of outcome.
To see this, suppose there are only two possible realizations of outcome. The project can be
either a success or a failure, Y = {s, f} with s > f . Whether the project is a success or a failure
depends on the realization of Θ. If Θ̂ ⊂ Θ the agent is aware of outcomes {s, f} but believes
probability distribution pi(.|e).15 Now consider the trade-off the principal faces when disclosing
θ 6∈ ΘA. Since the revelation of θ does not reveal any new outcomes the participation loss of
announcement is zero. The effect on incentives depends on how the revealed contingency affects
the perceived distribution of the agent. To see that the incentive effect can be negative, suppose
Θ = {θ1, θ2}, ΘA = {θ1} and assume θ2 is not informative, i.e. Pr[θ2 = 1|e
H ] = Pr[θ2 = 1|e
L].
In the basic model Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ = 1|eL] implies ∆CθΘA = 0, because the principal has the
choice to ignore the realization of θ2. Under Y = {s, f} this is no longer the case. Suppose that
y = s whenever θ1 = θ2 = 0 and y = f otherwise. Solving for the optimal compensation scheme,
the expected payment under Θ̂∗ = ΘA is smaller than the expected payment under Θ̂
∗ = Θ.16
There is an incentive loss of revealing θ2 because the perceived distribution of the unaware agent
is more informative about the action choice than the true distribution. A further discussion on
15Generally it is possible that the agent is only aware of one outcome. In that case the principal has to make the
agent aware of the other outcome, otherwise it is impossible to induce eH .
16If the principal leaves the agent unaware, the optimal compensation scheme is
C
u(s) = υ−1
(
U¯ +
Pr[θ1 = 1|e
L]eH − Pr[θ1 = 1|e
H ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
, C
u(f) = υ−1
(
U¯ −
Pr[θ1 = 0|e
L]eH − Pr[θ1 = 0|e
H ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
.
If the principal reveals contingency θ2, the optimal compensation scheme is
C
a(s) = υ−1
(
U¯ +
(
1− Pr[θ1 = 0|e
L] Pr[θ2 = 0|e
L]
)
eH −
(
1− Pr[θ1 = 0|e
H ] Pr[θ2 = 0|e
H ]
)
eL
Pr[θ1 = 0|eH ] Pr[θ2 = 0|eH ]− Pr[θ1 = 0|eL] Pr[θ2 = 0|eL]
)
C
a(f) = υ−1
(
U¯ −
Pr[θ1 = 0|e
L]eH − Pr[θ1 = 0|e
H ]eL
Pr[θ1 = 1|eL]− Pr[θ1 = 1|eH ]
)
.
So Cu(f) = Ca(f) and υ(Cu(s)) − υ(Ca(s)) = −Pr[θ2=1|e
H ]
Pr[θ2=0|eH ]
e
H−eL
Pr[θ1=0|eH ]−Pr[θ1=0|eL]
< 0, which implies that
E[Cu(Y )|eH ] < E[Ca(Y )|eH ].
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heterogeneous priors and moral hazard can be found in Santos-Pinto (2008) and De la Rosa (2011).
7.3 Optimal Action Choice
Throughout the analysis I assumed that E[Y |eH ]−E[Y |eL] is large enough such that the principal
always finds it optimal to induce eH . Unawareness makes incentives more costly, hence it is generally
possible that for different levels of awareness different levels of effort are optimal. Since effort can
only be high or low, the analysis of the optimal contract under low effort is straightforward.
Proposition 7.1 Assume A1 and A2. If eL is the action choice, the optimal contract is (ΘA, C
L)
with CL(y) = υ−1(U¯ − eL), ∀y ∈ Ŷ and CL(y) = 0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ.
Proof See Appendix A.2.9.
The optimal contract inducing low effort leaves the agent unaware because there is no incentive
effect. The principal induces low effort in equilibrium if
E[Y |eL]−
∏
θ∈Θ\ΘA
Pr[θ = 0|eL]υ−1(U¯ − eL) > E[Y |eH ]−
∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂∗
Pr[θ = 0|eL]E[CC
Θ̂∗
(Y )|eH ].
Whether this is the case or not depends on the distributional properties of the random variable Y ,
but it is easy to find examples where eH is the optimal action choice under full awareness and eL
is the optimal action choice under asymmetric awareness.
7.4 The Agent as the Residual Claimant
The basic model assumes that the principal is the residual claimant. In the presence of asymmetric
awareness ownership of the project matters, because the agent’s valuation of the project depends
on his level of awareness. If the agent is the residual claimant, unawareness generally affects his
perceived outside option
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ(y). The principal solves:
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eH)[P − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (y + C(y)− P ) ≥
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ(y)
eH ∈ argmax
e
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ(y + C(y)− P )− e

C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y,
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where P is the premium paid by the agent and C(y) is the outcome contingent transfer.17 As in
in the basic model, revealing a contingency θ 6∈ ΘA involves a trade-off between participation and
incentives. In addition, enlarging the agent’s awareness affects his perceived outside option. This
effect is favorable to the principal if∑
y∈Y˜
p˜i(y|eH)υ(y) <
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ(y),
where Θ˜ = Θ̂ ∪ θ, θ ∈ Θ\Θ̂. This is the case if E[Y |θ = 1] < E[Y |θ = 0], i.e. if θ = 1 is a negative
outcome shock. Consequently, if the agent is the residual claimant, not only do the distributional
properties of θ 6∈ ΘA matter but also the outcome its announcement reveals. Roughly speaking,
when the agent is the residual claimant the principal includes contingencies in the contract that are
very unlikely, highly informative and that reveal ”bad” outcomes. We can think of this setting as a
contract between an insurer and an insuree, where the insuree is partly unaware and effort affects
the probability of incurring a loss. The additional participation effect gives the insurer incentives
to reveal severe calamities to the insuree, such that the insuree is willing to buy insurance at a
higher price.
7.5 Unawareness and Zero Probability Beliefs
A frequently raised concern is whether unawareness is observationally equivalent to full awareness
with zero probability beliefs (Li, 2008). Epistemically, unawareness has very different properties
from zero probability beliefs. An agent is unaware if and only if he assigns probability zero to an
event and to its negation (Heifetz et al., 2011). Schipper (2012) shows how this feature also implies
behavioral differences between unawareness and zero probability beliefs. However, the results de-
rived in my model can be generated in a framework with full awareness and zero probability beliefs.
Under the interpretation of heterogeneous priors, there are some caveats to be taken into account.
In order to derive my results in a framework with full awareness and zero probability beliefs,
the agent needs to update a zero probability prior to a non-zero posterior. Note that such updating
cannot be interpreted as a consequence of the arrival of new information, since information in the
standard state space model expands the set of null states instead of narrowing it. Generating
my results in the standard state space framework requires a model that allows for manipulation
of beliefs rather than revelation of information. Allowing the principal to manipulate the agent’s
beliefs without the presence of hard information is rather difficult to motivate. Further, it is
important to note that reporting the true distribution is not incentive compatible for the principal
if lying is possible. Consequently, there are strong assumptions on the message set available to the
17Due to the limited liability constraint the principal would like to scale up both P and C. In order to have a
solution, one has to assume that such a contract elicits suspicion on the side of the agent.
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principal necessary.18 Given these caveats, asymmetric awareness seems to be a more natural way
to think about this environment and the arising trade-off.
8 Conclusion
This paper incorporates asymmetric awareness in the classical principal-agent model. It shows that
the principal makes the agent strategically aware and that the optimal contract can be incomplete.
Enlarging the agent’s awareness involves a trade-off between participation and incentives. The
cost of disclosing contingencies to the agent is the payment in the states that the agent is initially
unaware of. The gain of disclosing contingencies to the agent is the richer information structure
that is used to induce incentives. Hence, it is profitable to announce contingencies that have a low
probability but are highly correlated with the effort of the agent. Under relatively mild assumptions
the optimal contract is justifiable for the agent, which means that the optimal contract maximizes
the principal’s expected profit evaluated at the beliefs of the agent.
If we allow for competition among principals, in the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium the
agent is fully aware and principals make zero profits. If the contract is required to be justifiable
for the agent, this equilibrium is no longer necessarily unique but when the number of principals is
large enough uniqueness is restored.
In the proposed model, the principal is able to implement zero payments whenever there is an
event the agent is initially unaware of. This may not be feasible in real-life contracting situations.
Restricting the set of feasible contracts allows us to generate results that are closer to observed
contracts, but the basic trade-off prevails. If, for example, the compensation scheme is restricted
to be monotone in the outcome, there are three effects driving the optimal revelation strategy:
In addition to the participation and incentive effect we saw in the basic model also the revealed
outcomes matter, where it is most costly to disclose low outcomes to the contracting partner.
Restricting the set of feasible contracts adds interesting features to the optimal compensation
scheme and revelation strategy, but as long as the contracting partner with superior awareness
is able to profit from the other’s limited understanding of the underlying uncertainties the basic
trade-off prevails.
18One may argue that also in the framework with unawareness an implicit assumption is that the principal can
only reveal ”true” contingencies. One could imagine a case, where the principal can include virtual events (e.g. the
possibility of a dragon), but since I assume that the agent, once aware, completely understands all consequences and
the probability distribution of a contingency, the restriction to ”true” contingencies seems to be much more natural.
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A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Foundations of the Unawareness Structure
My model adopts the unawareness structure introduced by Heifetz et al. (2006). They propose a
generalized state space model that allows for non-trivial unawareness in multi-agent settings and
strong properties of knowledge. In Heifetz et al. (2008), the authors provide complete and sound
axiomatization for their class of unawareness structures. For ease of exposition, the basic set up in
this paper is a strongly simplified version of the original model, foregoing the formal introduction
of state spaces, projections among them, events, etc. This section does not present the generalized
state space model in detail, but provides some insights on how my basic model is built on the
foundational literature.
The unawareness structure proposed by Heifetz et al. (2006/2011) consists of a lattice of dis-
joint space spaces S = {S
Θ̂
}
Θ̂⊆Θ
, with a partial order  on S. SΘ′  SΘ′′ means that SΘ′ is
more expressive than SΘ′′ , so the spaces are ordered according to their richness in terms of facts
that they can describe. The upmost state space SΘ is interpreted as the objective state space. Let
Ω :=
⋃
Θ̂⊆Θ
S
Θ̂
denote the union of all state spaces with typical element ω. Any ω ∈ S
Θ̂
can be inter-
preted as a vector of realizations of the random variables in Θ̂, the starting point of the basic model.
For any SΘ′ , SΘ′′ ∈ S such that SΘ′  SΘ′′ , there is a surjective projection r
SΘ′
SΘ′′
: SΘ′ → SΘ′′ ,
where r
SΘ′
SΘ′′
(ω) is the restricted description of ω ∈ SΘ′ in the limited vocabulary of SΘ′′ . Let
g(SΘ′′) = {SΘ′ ∈ S : SΘ′  SΘ′′} denote the set of state spaces that are at least as expressive as
SΘ′′ . Further, given a set of states D ⊆ SΘ′′ , let D
↑ =
⋃
SΘ′∈g(SΘ′′ )
(r
SΘ′
SΘ′′
)−1(D) denote all ω ∈ Ω
that describe D in at least as expressive vocabulary as SΘ′′ . Then an event is a pair (D
↑, SΘ′′) with
D ⊆ SΘ′′ and SΘ′′ ∈ S. Back to the basic model an elementary event that some proposition θ ∈ Θ
is true is denoted by (ω↑, Sθ), where ω is the state in Sθ in which θ is true (note that Sθ has two
elements). Consequently, ω↑ is the set of states in Ω where the proposition θ is expressible and true,
(Sθ\ω)
↑ is the set of states in Ω where proposition θ is expressible and false and Ω\{ω↑ ∪ (S\ω)↑}
is the set of states where neither the event of θ being true nor false is expressible. If the agent is
aware of Θ̂ and θ 6∈ Θ̂ than S
Θ̂
⊂ Ω\{ω↑ ∪ (S\ω)↑}.
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Similar to the basic model, define y = f(ω), ω ∈ SΘ, where f is a one-to-one function. The
agent cannot express SΘ and consequently cannot know function f . It is assumed that the agent’s
perceived outcome is equal to the actual outcome when no unforeseen contingency is realized. Let
(ωθ=0
↑, Sθ), ωθ=0 ∈ Sθ denote the event that θ = 0. Then the agent’s perceived outcome function
is defined by
f̂(ω) := f
{(rSΘS
Θ̂
)−1
(ω)
}
∩
 ⋂
θ∈Θ\Θ̂
(ωθ=0)
↑

 , ω ∈ S
Θ̂
.
It is easy to check that this coincides with the original specification of the outcome function.
In Heifetz et al. (2011) the generalized state space model is augmented by probabilistic beliefs.
Let µ denote a probability measure on SΘ. Then the marginal µ̂ of µ on SΘ̂ is defined by
µ̂(ω) := µ
((
r
SΘ
S
Θ̂
)−1
(ω)
)
, ω ∈ S
Θ̂
.
In the basic set up we are interested in conditional probabilities on effort, so define µ(ω|e), ω ∈ SΘ
and µ̂(ω|e), ω ∈ S
Θ̂
analogously. Then let pi(y|e) := µ
(
f−1(y)|e
)
and pi(y) = µ̂
(
f̂−1(y)|e
)
. Under
the assumption of independence, this yields pi(y|e) = Π(Θ̂|e)pi(y|e), the original definition in the
model.
A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Suppose ΘA ⊂ Θ̂
∗. The optimal compensation scheme is Ĉ∗(y) = υ−1(U¯ + eH) for all y ∈ Ŷ and
Ĉ∗(y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y\Ŷ. Then the expected payment is∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂∗
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]υ−1(U¯ + eH),
which is clearly greater than
∏
θ∈Θ\ΘA
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]υ−1(U¯ + eH), the expected payment under
Θ̂∗ = ΘA, due to the assumption pi(y|e) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y. Hence Θ̂
∗ cannot be optimal.
A.2.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Suppose λ = 0. Since
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH) =
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eL) = 1 and pi(.|eH) 6= pi(.|eL) there must exist
some y ∈ Ŷ such that pi(y|eH)− pi(y|eL) < 0. But since γ ≥ 0, λ = 0 would imply that 1υ′(C(y)) ≤ 0
27
for some y ∈ Ŷ, which violates the assumption υ′(·) > 0. Hence λ > 0.
Now suppose γ = 0. Then, the first-order conditions of the optimization problem imply that
compensation is fixed across outcomes within the agent’s awareness. But this implies that the
incentive constraint is no longer satisfied. Hence, γ > 0.
A.2.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Let S˜ denote the state space, let y˜ denote the output function with range Y˜ and let p˜i(.|e) denote
the probability belief given awareness Θ̂ ∪ Z. Further, let ρ : Y˜ −→ Ŷ be the mapping from set Y˜
to set Ŷ, where ρ(y˜(s˜)) = ŷ(ŝ) and ŝ ∈ Ŝ is a subsequence of s˜ ∈ S˜. Now consider the compensa-
tion scheme C˜ with C˜(y) = CC
Θ̂
(ρ(y)) for all y ∈ Y˜. Note that C˜ satisfies both participation and
incentive constraint with equality.
Suppose Pr[θ = 1|eH ] = Pr[θ = 1|eL], ∀θ ∈ Z. Then, for any y ∈ Y˜ we have
p˜i(y|eL)
p˜i(y|eH)
=
pi(y|eL)
pi(y|eH)
.
Hence, CC
Θ̂
satisfies the first order conditions and consequently solves the optimization problem.
∆CZ
Θ̂
= 0.
Now, suppose Pr[θ = 1|eH ] 6= Pr[θ = 1|eL] for some θ ∈ Z. Then, there must exist some
y, y′ ∈ ρ−1(y), y ∈ Ŷ such that
p˜i(y|eL)
p˜i(y|eH)
6=
p˜i(y′|eL)
p˜i(y′|eH)
.
Consequently, CC
Θ̂
does not satisfy the first-order conditions. Hence, CC
Θ̂
is feasible but not optimal,
which implies that E[CC
Θ̂∪Z
(Y |eH)] < E[CC
Θ̂
(Y |eH)] and ∆CZ
Θ̂
> 0.
A.2.4 Proof of Lemma 5.3
W.l.o.g. we can assume Pr[θ = 1|eH ] > Pr[θ = 1|eL], θ ∈ Θ̂. CC
Θ̂
is the compensation scheme that
solves the principal’s optimization problem given full awareness and information structure Θ̂. Let
E
Θ̂
denote the expectation operator with respect to awareness Θ̂. Then we have:
E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|e, θ = 1
]
> E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|e, θ = 0
]
, e = eL, eH ,
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which follows directly from the first-order conditions. The incentive constraint can be rewritten as
Pr[θ = 1|eH ]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eH , θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eH ]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eH , θ = 0
]
− eH
= Pr[θ = 1|eL]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eL]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 0
]
− eL.
Now, consider probability Pr[θ = 1|eL] − ε with ε > 0. Under CC
Θ̂
and Pr[θ = 1|eL] − ε the
participation constraint is clearly satisfied with equality. Looking at the incentive constraint it is
easy to see that
Pr[θ = 1|eH ]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eH , θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eH ]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eH , θ = 0
]
− eH
> Pr[θ = 1|eL]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 1
]
+ Pr[θ = 0|eL]E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 0
]
− eL
−ε
(
E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 1
]
− E
Θ̂
[
υ(CC
Θ̂
(Y ))|eL, θ = 0
])
.
We know that under the optimal transfer rule both constraints are satisfied with equality. Con-
sequently, given Pr[θ = 1|eL] − ε, CC
Θ̂
is feasible but not optimal, so we have V
Θ̂
(Pr[θ = 1|eL]) >
V
Θ̂
(Pr[θ = 1|eL] − ε). The same line of reasoning applies to Pr[θ = 1|eH ]. In that case both
constraints are slack. Hence, the V
Θ̂
is decreasing in ∆θ for all θ ∈ Θ̂.
A.2.5 Proof of Lemma 5.5
NG(θn)−NG(θn+1) = α
N−n−1
(
α2E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]− 2αE[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ] + E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ]
)
This function is continuous in α. Moreover, as α goes to zeroNG(θn)−NG(θn+1) is strictly positive.
Now, if NG(θn)−NG(θn+1) < 0 for some α, there has to be an α such that NG(θn)−NG(θn+1) = 0
by the Intermediate Value Theorem. Solving for α we have
α1/2 =
2E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]±
√
4E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]2 − 4E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ]
2E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]
.
If the discriminant 4(E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]2−E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ]) < 0 there are no real roots.
Hence, whenever E[CC
Θ̂n
(Y )|eH ]2 < E[CC
Θ̂n−1
(Y )|eH ]E[CC
Θ̂n+1
(Y )|eH ], NG(θn)−NG(θn+1) > 0 for
all α ∈ (0, 1).
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition 5.7
It is clear that whenever EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) < 0, the agent thinks that the principal would be strictly
better off by not offering the contract. Similarly if EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL) the agent
cannot rationalize why the principal proposes an incentive compatible contract. Hence, (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗)
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cannot be justifiable.
Now suppose EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ 0 and EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL).
Justifiability of Ĉ∗: If Θ̂∗ = Θ, principal and agent share the same beliefs. Hence, Ĉ∗ maximizes
the principal’s expected payoff from the agent’s perspective. If Θ̂∗ 6= Θ, Ĉ∗(y) = CC
Θ̂∗
(y) for all
y ∈ Ŷ. Since the agent thinks that the contract is complete, Ĉ∗ maximizes the principal’s payoff
according to the beliefs of the agent.
Justifiability of Θ̂∗: Θ̂∗ is optimal for the principal given the agent’s beliefs if
E
[
CC
Θ̂∗
(Y |eH)
]
≤
∏
θ∈Θ̂∗\Z
Pr[θ = 0|eH ]E
[
CC
Θ̂∗\Z
(Y )|eH
]
,
for any Z ⊆ Θ̂∗\ΘA. This coincides with the optimality condition of the principal. Hence, whenever
EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ 0 and EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eH) ≥ EUAP (Θ̂
∗, Ĉ∗, eL), (Θ̂∗, Ĉ∗) is justifiable.
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Existence: Consider a deviation of principal i. The strategies are Θ̂j = Θ and Cj = C
∗ for all
j = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ..., N . A deviation in Θ̂i clearly leaves the expected payoff unaffected because
the agent is aware of Θ̂1 ∪ ... ∪ Θ̂N = Θ for all Θ̂i ⊆ Θ. A deviation in Ci is not profitable for
the standard Bertrand argument. C∗ maximizes the agent’s expected utility given the zero outside
option of the principal. A deviation Ci 6= C
∗ must make either the agent or the principal worse off.
If the agent is worse off, he rejects the contract and the expected payoff is zero. If the principal is
worse off, he has a negative expected payoff. Hence, deviating in (Θ̂i, Ci) is not profitable.
Uniqueness: It is easy to see that this is the only symmetric Nash equilibrium. If Θ̂i = Θ, i =
1, ..., N principals engage in a standard Bertrand competition. The unique symmetric equilibrium
is Ci = C
∗ for all i = 1, ..., N . Now suppose Θ̂i = Θ˜ ⊂ Θ, i = 1, ..., N . Given Θ˜ principals engage
in a Bertrand competition over the compensation rule. But as profits become small enough it is
profitable to announce a contingency in Θ\Θ˜. This deviation allows principal i to capture the
whole market and make positive profits, because the agent realizes that he receives zero in some
states if he accepts one of the other contracts. Hence, Θ˜ cannot be an equilibrium announcement
and the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium is (Θ̂i, Ci) = (Θ, C
∗), i = 1, ..., N .
30
A.2.8 Proof of Proposition 6.2
Suppose Θ̂i = Θ̂ ⊂ Θ, i = 1, ..., N . Let C¯ denote the solution to the problem
max
C
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eH)υ (C (y))− eH
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e) [y − C(y)] ≥ 0
eH ∈ argmax
e
∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|e)υ (C (y))− e
 ,
and let Ĉ(y) = C¯(y), ∀y ∈ Ŷ and Ĉ(y) = 0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ. Then, principal i’s expected profit
is EUi(Θ̂, Ĉ) =
1
N
∑
y∈Y pi(y|e)
[
y − Ĉ(y)
]
. Since Ĉ is independent of N , the expected profit is
decreasing in N . If i announces θ ∈ Θ\Θ̂, he offers a compensation scheme C˜, which solves the
following optimization problem
max
C
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|e) [y − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Y˜
p˜i(y|eH)υ (C(y)) ≥
∑
y∈Y˜
p˜i(y|eH)υ
(
Ĉ(y)
)
eH ∈ argmax
e
∑
y∈Y˜
p˜i(y|e)υ (C (y))− e
 ,
where y˜ is the agent’s perceived outcome function with range Y˜ and probability belief p˜i(.|e) as-
sociated to set Θ˜ := Θ̂ ∪ θ. Principal i’s expected profit is EUi(Θ˜, C˜) =
∑
y∈Y pi(y|e)
[
y − C˜(y)
]
,
which is independent of N . Hence, there always exists an N¯ such that
1
N
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|e)
[
y − Ĉ(y)
]
<
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|e)
[
y − C˜(y)
]
for all N ≥ N¯ .
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A.2.9 Proof of Proposition 7.1
When eL is optimal, the principal solves
max
Θ̂,C(·)
∑
y∈Y
pi(y|eL) [y − C(y)]
subject to ∑
y∈Ŷ
pi(y|eL)υ (C (y))− eL ≥ U
C(y) ≥ 0, ∀y ∈ Y.
The optimal compensation scheme for a given Θ̂ is CL(y) = υ−1(U¯ − eL), ∀y ∈ Ŷ and CL(y) =
0, ∀y ∈ Y\Ŷ. The expected payment is
E[CL(Y )] =
∏
θ∈Θ\Θ̂
Pr[θ = 0|eL]υ−1(U¯ − eL),
which is clearly minimized for Θ̂ = ΘA.
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